YORAM ETTINGER: NETANYAHU’S TEST….RED LINES VS. PINK LINES
Netanyahu's Test: Red Lines VS Pink Lines
Yoram Ettinger, "Second Thought" http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3964458,00.html
George Mitchell, President Obama's Special Envoy, is testing Prime Minister
Netanyahu: Has he learned from past errors by repeating them - which would
demolish his credibility- or by avoiding them, which would resurrect his
domestic and international clout?
In order to enhance his own clout and Israel's posture of deterrence - which
constitute essential prerequisites to Israel's national security, Israel's
strategic ties with the USA and to the attainment of durable peace - it is
incumbent upon Netanyahu to refute Obama's Mitchell's and Clinton's
assumption that he (Netanyahu) tends to transform Red Lines into Pink Lines.
On May 29, 2009 - six months before the freeze on Jewish construction in
Judea & Samaria and three weeks before Netanyahu's "Two States Speech" at
Bar Ilan University - the Washington Post reported that "Abu Mazen fully
expects that Netanyahu will never agree to the full settlement freeze." Abu
Mazen assumed that it would take a multi-year US pressure to force Netanyahu
to publicly accept the two-states formula and to freeze Israeli settlement
construction." The Washington Post assumed that it is "a Palestinian fantasy
that the US will simply force Israel to make critical concessions, whether
or not its democratic government agrees, while Arabs passively watch and
applaud." However, Abu Mazen, the Washington Post and Obama have learned
that Jerusalem is capable of transforming Red Lines into Pink Lines.
In March 2009, upon Netanyahu's entry into the Prime Minister Office,
Obama's team was convinced that he would be susceptible to pressure for a
complete freeze of Jewish construction in Judea & Samaria. They dismissed
the advice by veterans of President Clinton's team to refrain from such a
pressure, lest Netanyahu defy the pressure, while enjoying the support of
most Americans and most legislators, thus dragging Obama into a losing
proposition. However, they found out that Jerusalem could transform Red
Lines into Pink Lines.
Netanyahu's first eighteen months in office demonstrated that submission to
pressure intensified pressure, radicalized Arab expectations and demands,
undermined Israel's moral standing, eroded the image of the Prime Minister
and the strategic posture of the Jewish State in the Middle East and in
Washington, DC and weakened the conviction of Israelis in their own cause.
In contrast, the eight years of Prime Minister Shamir in office were top
heavy on US resentment of his steadfastness and defiance. Washington
opposed Shamir's policy toward the Palestinians, but respected his
principle-driven policy and his capability to withstand domestic and
external pressure. On a rainy day, Shamir was a unique strategic ally in
face of regional and global mutual threats, which were significantly more
important than the Palestinian issue in impacting vital US interests. Thus,
irrespective of the unbridgeable gap, between the US and Israel, in the
narrow context of the Arab-Israeli context, the bilateral strategic
cooperation in the wider regional and global context expanded in an
unprecedented manner. Jerusalem should have learned that holding on to Red
Lines bolsters Israel's Life Line.
Prime Minister Netanyahu crossed the Rubicon on June 14, 2009, publicly
endorsing the Two States Solution, in order to alleviate Obama's pressure.
However, as expected, the pressure intensified, the Palestinians would not
reciprocate and on November 25, 2009, Netanyahu was forced to accept a full
freeze of Jewish construction in Judea & Samaria, while Arab construction
crossed the charts. Netanyahu's retreat adrenalized the veins of Team
Obama, which stepped up the pressure, convincing Netanyahu to move the goal
posts further, expanding the freeze to Jerusalem.
In September 1997, Palestinian terrorism exploded against the backdrop of
the opening of the Western Wall Tunnel. Washington expected a heavy-handed
Israeli response, but was astounded to witness a hand-in-hand
Netanyahu-Arafat visit to Washington, DC. The 1997 Hebron and the 1998 Wye
Accords, the willingness to refrain from construction in Har-Khoma and
Ma'aleh Hazeitim (in Jerusalem) and to sweep under the carpet Abu Mazen's
hate-education and incitement, Holocaust denial and promotion of terrorism
have further corroded the credibility of Jerusalem's Red Lines.
Will Prime Minister Netanyahu learn from past dramatic errors and their
adverse impact upon Israel's strategic image? Will he substantiate the
Washington Post May 2009 assumption that it takes a "Palestinian Fantasy" to
assume that a US president can impose upon Israel critical concessions? Will
Netanyahu leverage his own unique intellectual and communications
capabilities, Obama's political vulnerability and heavy constraints, the
expected drastic changes on Capitol Hill and the awesome platforms of
bi-partisan support of the Jewish State among Americans? Will he leverage
the unique commitment to enhanced US-Israel strategic relations by
Republicans and Democrats in Congress, which is equal in power to the
President in shaping domestic and international policies?
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