RUTHFULLY YOURS

I haven’t always been the biggest fan of John Bolton. As part of the Bush Administration, he helped make the case for a disastrous invasion of a secular Arab dictatorship (however loathsome) in the service of a democratization project that was from the first delusional—as should have been obvious to anyone not in the grip of neoconservative ideology.

It was one thing to favor removing the person of Saddam Hussein from power; given his vicious, erratic behavior, his financial support for the families of suicide-murderers who struck Israeli civilians, his violation of the peace agreement that ended the first Gulf War, and his repeated acts of aggression against his neighbors, we had every reason to want to swap this tin-pot dictator for another. A military strike that decapitated his regime and installed another Sunni to run the Ba’athist regime in a less bloody fashion would have suited American interests—and, almost certainly, saved tens of thousands of Iraqi lives (not to mention American servicemen). Alternatively, a sustained conventional bombing campaign aimed at the Iraqi army and infrastructure could have left the Iraqi elite with the choice between a coup that removed Saddam and a return to 18th century living standards. Had we not been committed to a fantastical game of “democratic dominos,” we might at least have tried such a stratagem. But we didn’t, and here we are, some eight years later, still pouring our dwindling treasure into a propping up a Shi’ite regime (now allied to Iran) that permits or encourages the ethnic cleansing of Christians.

But I want to give Bolton credit: It seems he has learned from our mistakes. Sobered, Bolton seems to realize that we can no more implant free constitutions and Anglo-Saxon liberties in the heart of the Dar-al-Islam than we can grow mangoes on the moon. In his new piece for the British magazine Standpoint, Bolton examines the recent events in Egypt, and he sounds like he has abandoned Wilsonian fantasies, and come to stand on solid ground with Metternich—favoring an approach to the Middle East based on prudence, intent on containing the dangerous ideological energies that convulse the Islamic world, in defense of legitimate American interests.

In this case, as Bolton tries to demonstrate, those interests actually converge with the long-term well-being of the region itself. It may sound paternalistic, but I’m long past feeling the least particle of Western guilt about that: In denying the Arab mob what it wants, we can offer it what it needs: a slow introduction into institutional government, with limited representation, for as long as it takes for Islamic countries to prove that they are capable of guaranteeing minority rights and remaining at peace with America and her allies. If they cannot demonstrate those two conditions, we should not support—and indeed, should actively oppose—attempts to hand over power to majorities who allow themselves to be led by Islamic supremacists. In doing so he cites John Stuart Mill’s historic cautions about introducing democratic institutions in countries where the preconditions for it are lacking, Jeanne Kirkpatrick’s famous warning about the danger of replacing authoritarian despotisms with totalitarian revolutionaries, and the grim experience of post-colonial governments: one man, one vote, one time.

Bolton offers evidence to show that while the Muslim Brotherhood did not spark the riots that toppled Mubarak, they were quick to coopt them and turn them to their advantage—an advantage they will only press if the Egyptian army gives up power too quickly:

So, today’s pressing question for Egypt is what steps the new military rulers should take. First, there should not be a rush to elections. It was a fatal mistake for Palestinians when the Bush Administration, reading supposedly irrefutable polls that Hamas could not win, scheduled elections in 2006 that allowed Hamas to do just that. Democracy is a culture, a way of life, as Mill and Kirkpatrick recognised, not simply the counting of votes. Any realistic assessment of Egypt’s “opposition” shows it to be weak, disorganised, and indifferently led. Moving to early elections, as the Muslim Brotherhood wants, will not bring the Age of Aquarius, but only benefit those factions with existing political infrastructures, which is a formula for domination by the Brotherhood. Far better to proceed when the true democrats are ready, which may not be soon enough for some, but which is unambiguously the more pro-democratic course.

Furthermore, Bolton offers the following procedural advice:

[P]articipation in the elections, whenever scheduled, should be limited to real political parties. From Mussolini to Putin, from Hamas to Hezbollah, terrorists, totalitarians and their ilk masquerading as political parties do not really believe in representative government. Banning such faux-democrats from participating in the legitimate political process until they become true political parties is entirely legitimate, and may well be critical to avert disaster. America did so for decades by outlawing the Communist Party, as post-World War II Germany did with the National Socialists. Thus, for President Obama to say, as he did, that the transition “must bring all of Egypt’s voices to the table” is not only naive, but fundamentally dangerous.

Of equal importance, Bolton warns us against the temptation to fetishize procedure over outcome, and sit by on the sidelines as an impartial referee in the struggle between political good and evil:

[T]he West should provide material assistance to those truly committed to a free and open society. In days of yore, the United States supplied extensive clandestine assistance to prevent communist takeovers in post-World War II elections in France, Italy and elsewhere. Undoubtedly, the Obama Administration is too fastidious for such Cold War-style behaviour, but perhaps overt, democratic institution-building assistance is not too much to ask. Advocates of doing nothing will argue that Western assistance, overt or covert, will “taint” the real democrats, and should therefore be avoided. Of course, there are always excuses for doing nothing. At a minimum, we should let Egyptians themselves decide whether they will be “tainted” with outside assistance; if they can live with the taint, so should we.

The problem, historically, with Realpolitik in America is that it militates against our own idealistic national rhetoric. To justify a revolt of colonial elites against a fundamentally harmless British Parliament and toothless king, our founders invoked the whole apparatus of Enlightenment liberalism—and now we are paying the price, in the form of an unspoken, unquestioned national ideology of democracy at any price. We must supplement and correct this tendency by insisting that Enlightenment ends—the rights of life, liberty, and property—are even more important than Enlightenment means such as elections. To the degree that Islamic parties and Islamic law are incompatible with liberal ends, they must and should be repressed by illiberal means. A morally inflected Realpolitik would keep those liberal ends in mind, but never be bewitched by empty rhetoric that promises democracy on the cheap. It took hundreds of years for Europe to move from absolutism to liberalism—and it had crucial advantages such as the separation of spiritual and temporal power, ancient feudal traditions of decentralism, and the Christian notion of the sanctity of the person. Islamic countries, lacking all these things, may never be ripe for liberal institutions. Until and unless they evolve in this direction, the “will of the people” in such countries will never be a wholesome force which we should welcome, but only a problem we must contain.