RUTHFULLY YOURS

In both Israel and the United States, the two countries where more than 80 percent of the world’s Jews now live, there have been major changes in the composition of the Jewish community in recent decades. As Peter Beinart points out in his new book “The Crisis of Zionism,” Orthodox Jews, who make up about 10% of the American Jewish population, are now just over 20% of those who are members of synagogues in the U.S. Children in Orthodox families account for 40% of the children whose families are members of synagogues in the U.S. The same pattern is seen in major Jewish organizations in America. When I started attending the annual American Israel Public Affairs Committee policy conference more than 20 years ago, few Orthodox Jews were in attendance. Now, that has changed dramatically, with the Orthodox very well represented among both adults and students. About three-quarters of America’s Orthodox population are Modern Orthodox, the remainder ultra-Orthodox.

Beinart’s book bemoans the fact that Israel is losing the support of young, liberal Jews in the U.S. He blames this in part on Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank, which he argues is unappealing to Jews whose politics are defined first and foremost by an allegiance to social justice (caring for those in need). But Beinart is honest enough to admit that Israel’s settlement policy is not the biggest problem many young Jews have with Israel.

Jews have always been liberals in the U.S., and that has certainly been the case since the 1967 Six-Day War when Israel’s administration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip began. What has changed is that many of today’s young Jews are barely “Jewish,” in any sense of what that word has meant for centuries. If one does not belong to a synagogue, does not lead a Jewish life (kashrut, Shabbat observance, holiday observance), knows nothing or almost nothing about Jewish history or Jewish religious law, and neither Judaism nor Israel was ever anything special to that person growing up, the reality is that in the religious sense, the individual described is secular, with more in common with non-Jews who are also secular, than with Jews who are more observant or knowledgeable about Judaism. Should it be a surprise that discussing Israel in mixed company with non-Jews is uncomfortable for young secular Jews brought up this way?

Beinart points to a survey that reveals that Orthodox Jews under age 40 are four times as likely to feel extremely or very attached to Israel as Reform Jews under age 40. Among American Jews over age 60, Orthodox Jews were twice as likely to feel this way as members of Reform temples. The comparative ratio between Orthodox Jews and unaffiliated Jews would likely be even higher than the ratio between Orthodox and Reform Jews. In other words, Orthodox Jews are rapidly increasing their share of the young Jewish population in the U.S., and this segment is very attached to Israel. In 20 years, after another generation with an intermarriage rate that stands at well over 50% among non-Orthodox Jews (the Orthodox intermarriage rate is negligible), the ratios will be even more stark. Among secular Jews, the marriage rate itself is dropping. Beinart believes the overall birth rate in the Orthodox community is now double to triple that of secular Jews. It does not take a math genius to extrapolate these trends out a few generations and see a very different Jewish America.

It is understandable why Beinart is concerned that young secular Jews no longer care about Israel. He fears seeing the Jewish community in the U.S. becoming more observant, and in his words, more tribal (insular). It will also be more Republican, more politically conservative and more supportive of Israel, and certainly not as quick to attack Israel as Beinart and the denizens of J Street.

Beinart calls for vouchers for day-school education, an idea that has already been shown to be very popular among African American and Hispanic parents whose kids are trapped in failing inner-city schools. But vouchers are likely to make religious day school more of an option primarily for parents who are already serious Jews, whether Orthodox, Conservative or Reform. The true secularists detest the idea of religious education and are wedded to their love of a democratic egalitarian public school system, which of course does not exist in many places in the U.S. today (public schools in most inner-city Chicago schools are far different from those in Chicago’s affluent North Shore suburbs). Secular parents with means, including Jewish parents, who fight vouchers in the public school system, are happy to send their own kids to private schools, so long as the schools are not religious ones.

If vouchers for religious schools became widespread in communities where the Jewish population was of significant size, it would likely lead to less financial pressure on observant Jewish families, but virtually no change in the continued separation of the secular Jewish young from Judaism.

In Israel, the religious and traditional share of the Jewish population is far larger than in the U.S. — perhaps a third of the Jewish population, with the haredim alone accounting for 8%, and another 25% identifying as either “religious” (12%) or “religious traditionalists” (13%). Even among the 42% who identify as secular, they, like all Jews in Israel, regardless of synagogue attendance or religious observance, still live in a country with a 75% Jewish majority, which runs on a Jewish calendar and clock. Shabbat is different from Thursday. Yom Kippur is different from any other day. Days of remembrance for the fallen soldiers and Holocaust victims, and the celebration of Israel’s Independence Day are true national holidays. There is pride in being part of the modern Jewish state, whatever its flaws and imperfections.

As in the U.S., the birth rate among religious or Orthodox Jews is far higher than among secular Jews. But unlike in the U.S., the birth rate among all Jews is rising, including among secular Jews. It now averages three children per woman of child-bearing age — by far the highest birth rate among the world’s developed democracies. As in the U.S., this too has political implications, since the Orthodox and other religious Jews tend to be supportive of either religious or right-wing political parties. Members of Knesset from the religious parties tend to more easily align with the Right than the Left to form coalition governments.

There are signs of slippage in the support level of American Jews for U.S. President Barack Obama since his victory in 2008. While most commentators have suggested this is due to concerns about Obama’s policies toward Israel, or part of a general weakening of support among all Americans due to the sluggish economy, there may be another reason: America’s changing Jewish demography is beginning to change the face of new young Jewish voters.