The ‘Spontaneous’ ‘Self Radicalized’ ‘Lone Wolf’ Misnomer: Rachel Ehrenfeld
The characterization of Islamist jihadist attacks as “spontaneous” or committed by “self-radicalized Lone Wolves” seems inaccurate and misleading. All attackers we
have seen in recent years were radicalized in mosques or Muslim schools they attended, online, in chatrooms and by social media they share with others.
While sometimes only one shooter, or stabber, was caught, they have relied on associates and networks for financial and tactical support. Moreover, they have chosen their targets and victims to “send a message.” The tight-knit Muslim communities supply a rich diet oh hatred to infidels and the Jews, and serve as a fertile ground for nurturing martyrs. Instead of pointing the finger at those who invite youngsters to join then train and support them, we seem to be overtaken by political correctness thus refusing to blame entire communities, which have done nothing to curb jihadist incitement, and from which the jihadists are setting out to attack us. Instead we parented that they are just a small group of misfits. This attitude will do little to stop such attacks – Rachel Ehrenfeld
The director of the Military and Strategic Affairs Program and Cyber Security Program at INSS, Gabi Siboni, has his own scholarly take on “Confronting Spontaneous Terrorist Attacks”:
“A prominent feature of many terrorist attacks in recent months by Islamic radicals is their independent, spontaneous, unplanned nature – sometimes called the work of lone wolves. The phenomenon presents a serious challenge to the security establishments in the nations where there has been a rise in the scope of spontaneous attacks, the West in general and Israel in particular. A critical review of the spontaneous attacks and some of the perpetrators points to two key characteristics that could help formulate a current doctrine of preventing attacks. The first is the basic profile of the attacker; the second is the behavior of the attacker just before the attack. Based on the combination of both factors, it is possible to construct a profile of the potential attacker and assign him/her a risk threshold that if crossed would indicate the intention to act. This in turn would raise the level of the risk to one that must be foiled….
The preventive doctrine developed by the General Security Services in Israel, which focused on suicide attacks, required comprehensive, invasive intelligence capabilities based on the assumption that most attacks are carried out with the help of some guiding hand. In most cases, there existed a supporting operational and logistical chain enhancing the conditions for a successful attack. These include: providing the attacker with intelligence about the target, constructing the explosives or other weapons required for the attack, briefing the attacker, transporting the attacker to the destination, and promising aid to the attacker’s family to convince him/her that they will be provided for after the act. This logistical and operational setup provided the security services with the opportunity to gather intelligence in advance, assess the threat, and then foil the attack via a range of operational measures, including the security fence. The measures to foil attacks contributed significantly to the fact that in recent years, suicide attacks became increasingly less frequent….More
*Gabi Siboni’s article was originally published in INSS No. 667, February 24, 2015.
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