An Energy Strategy to Stop Iranian Nukes (Part I of II) by Peter Huessy
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On April 14, 2015, by a unanimous vote, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a procedure for the Senate and House to review the future nuclear agreement with Iran. The Senate and House subsequently approved the bill and it was signed into law in late May.
What did we get? After the completion of an Iran nuclear deal the US Senate and House of Representatives will get to decide whether and when the previously approved Congressional sanctions on Tehran will end.
Critical to that determination will be whether the administration has sufficient leverage to get necessary Iranian concessions to make a deal worthwhile.
Supporters of the new preliminary framework with Iran on its nuclear work castigated supporters of this Congressional initiative. They described it as an attempt to “kill the Iran agreement”.
They challenged critics to come up with a better alternative deal.
They also claimed some opponents of the framework agreement simply wanted war with Iran or were opposed to an agreement only for partisan purposes.
A number of experts did propose alternatives to the current framework, only to be dismissed as unrealistic by deal supporters.
The challenge does raise some interesting questions foremost among many is what is wrong with seeking a better agreement? And if a better agreement than what is laid out in the framework is required, what leverage do we have to achieve such a better deal?
Certainly the negotiations are going to involve some give and take. It may end up with mostly Iran takes and US gives but there is a chance Iran’s strong desire to be free of sanctions will trump its unwillingness to at least agree now on inspection, sanction and verification terms it finds “insulting”.
For example, Iran insisted earlier that all sanctions have to be eliminated the day the deal is signed and Iran has “fulfilled” its initial promises. However, more recently a high ranking Iran official publicly noted he thought sanctions might not go away until the end of the year which may indicate some flexibility.
And the mullahs continue to dismiss any chance demand inspections of suspected sites will be part of a “deal”, but news reports indicate an agreement will not be viable unless such demand inspections are included in the agreement. And left unresolved of course is whether Iran comes clean over its previous military related nuclear work to say nothing of suspected future activity.
The administration’s negotiating strategy over the past six years has brought Iran to the table and an interim framework says its supporters. Critics, however, site the agreement to give Iran “a right to enrich” which is not in the underlying Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to which Iran remains a party. Any enrichment activity must follow IAEA rules with which Iran has decidedly not complied. And while the earlier UN sanctions required Iran to cease all enrichment, it continues to enrich now and can continue to do so under the terms of the framework.
The strategy of this administration has been accommodating to say the least. From the perspective of the plans critics it has been very weak.
For example, so much has been left off the table.
Iran has killed thousands of Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan. And will pay no price.
Iran killed additional thousands of Americans on 9-11. And will pay no price.*
Iran killed and wounded thousands at the Khobar Towers and the American embassies in Africa. And will pay no price.
Iran kidnapped and tortured Americans in 1979. And paid no price.
Iran has sponsored financed and armed terrorists worldwide. And paid no price.
Iran murders tens of thousands of its own people including homosexuals and political reformers. And pays no price.
Iran has the largest fleet of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Which will remain intact.
Iran will not pledge to end its terrorist ways. Their status as the world’s premier state sponsor of terror will not change.
In short the United States has looked the other way on all these issues apparently under the impression that such accommodation will bring Iran to the negotiating table and make more likely a nuclear agreement.
On the other hand, given this “deal” is designed to last at least a decade or more, there would be wisdom in “improving” our negotiating leverage especially over time.
It is not a question of supporting diplomacy or supporting war.
Proponents of the framework have wrongfully painted the choices as between diplomacy (their path) or sanctions, (they don’t work) or war (what opponents of the “deal” apparently prefer according to some deal adherents).
Dr. Henry Kissinger shot down this idea when he explained “a free standing diplomacy is an ancient American illusion. History offers few examples of it. The attempt to separate diplomacy and power results in power lacking direction and diplomacy being deprived of incentives.”
Put another way, as Senator Malcolm Wallop noted in his farewell speech to the US Senate, “Diplomacy without the threat of force is but prayer”.
More recently, one of America’s foremost analysts explained “Emphasizing diplomacy is inherently meaningless. To speak thus is to pretend either that the war’s issues are trivial or that words can make them so. Such pretense enables the further pretense that the speaker is not on either side, rather than on the side of peace…”
With sanctions removed, what leverage could the United States use down the road if Iran balks at demand inspections or coming clean on suspected violations of the accord? Parenthetically, if past and current sanctions don’t work, as deal advocates claim, why would “snapping them back” in the future work?
On the other hand, irrespective of whether sanctions of any kind could or could not secure Iranian compliance with a reasonably sound nuclear deal, could a new US energy strategy be key to the ability of Washington to secure needed Iranian compliance with a nuclear agreement?
What would such a strategy entail?
It would mean seven things all aimed at producing more US oil and gas.
First build the Keystone Pipeline.
Second open up the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and accessing its 16 billion barrels of oil for transit through the nearby trans-Alaskan pipeline system (TAPS). Such development as a portion of the ANWR would be the equivalent of a postage stamp on an NFL football field.
Third, permit environmentally sound fracking on both public and private lands.
Fourth, end the 1975 law banning oil and gas exports.
Fifth, end forthwith the Federal ethanol mandates that lower fuel mileage economy and undermine exports of US petroleum.
Sixth, build gas export terminals in the United States and export gas to Eastern Europe. One Baltic state ambassador said that would turn Russia from an energy bully to a supplicant.
And seventh, build a canal across Nicaragua and export US natural gas to China, thus reducing China’s cancer rate due to its massive coal use as well as reducing by 30% the air pollution in California whose origin is coal burned in China.
What would happen?
In 2012 the US energy department predicted fracking on Federal lands combined with enhanced conventional domestic production (even under current cumbersome rules) would add 1.8 million barrels of oil per day to oil produced by the United States by 2025. In late May, US oil production hit 9.5 million barrels a day, 2 million barrels a day ahead of the 2025 projection. A better target might be 11-12 million barrels a day within the next 1-2 years.
The Keystone pipeline would supplement United States supply by an additional 300 million barrels a day, while ANWR would add an additional 1.45 million barrels a day for a grand total of nearly 11 million barrels of oil per day from the initiatives proposed here.
By contrast Iran’s exports reached a low due to sanctions of 700,000 a day in 2011-12 and now average 1.4 million per day according to the latest data available.
However, domestic Iranian oil and gas consumption is projected to further significantly increase due to population and economic growth. In addition, considerable oil exports return to Iran in the form of refined petroleum products so all Iranian oil exports do not have to be replaced. The primary buyers of Iranian crude are China, India, Japan, South Korea and Turkey but their gas and oil needs can be supplied from other sources.
That’s where the US comes in.
(Read Part II tomorrow)
Peter Huessy is President of GeoStrategic Analysis of Potomac, Maryland , a defense and national security consulting firm.
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