THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL: DAVID HARRIS
http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-iran-nuclear-deal/?msource=DH080515&tr=y&auid=15869194
David Harris is the executive director of the American Jewish Committee (AJC)
When the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was announced in
Vienna on July 14, AJC issued a press release indicating that we would
first study the full text and its implications, and then take a
position on the deal, as the U.S. Congress launched into its 60-day
review period.
Over the past three weeks, AJC engaged in a very intensive,
open-minded, and thorough process of external consultations and
internal deliberations, involving many lay and staff leaders.
During this effort, we had the privilege of meeting privately with,
first, Secretary of State John Kerry, and, later, Under Secretary of
State Wendy Sherman, both of whom visited our New York headquarters.
We also had the opportunity to speak with Democratic and Republican
Members of Congress; diplomats from Europe, the Arab world, and
Israel; and respected analysts knowledgeable about both nuclear
diplomacy and Iran-related matters. And we were invited to participate
in discussions in Washington with President Barack Obama and Secretary
of Energy Ernest Moniz. We are grateful for all these opportunities.
We understood from the start that the Iran deal was not a simple
matter. Rather, it was one of the most consequential policy issues in
a generation. Thus, it could not be boiled down to a reflexive
reaction for or against, or a glib one-line response.
We listened carefully to the arguments of those in favor of the deal,
who, inter alia, asserted that Iran’s pathways to a nuclear bomb would
be blocked for at least 10 – 15 years; that it would use the cash
windfall of unfrozen assets and the lifting of sanctions largely for
domestic purposes; that the Middle East would not witness the specter
of nuclear proliferation; that the inspection and verification regime
would be the most intrusive ever developed, with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) up to the task, including ascertaining
possible military dimensions of Iran’s past program; and that perhaps
Iran would, with time, open up to positive change and greater
cooperation.
And we listened to the opponents, who asserted, inter alia, that this
deal at best only delayed but did not dismantle Iran’s nuclear
infrastructure; that it in fact created a legitimate pathway for Iran
to emerge as a nuclear threshold state even if it never violated the
deal; that at least some of Iran’s new infusion of funds would be used
to stoke further terror and instability in the Middle East and beyond;
that America’s allies in the region were profoundly unsettled by the
agreement and its broader implications; and that there were concerns
about Iran’s ability to deceive the international community, as it had
done in the past at Natanz and Fordow, and as other countries,
including North Korea and Syria, had also done.
In the end, AJC’s leadership concluded overwhelmingly that we must
oppose this deal.
Much as we respect those in the P5+1, led by the United States, who
painstakingly negotiated the agreement over the span of years, and who
confronted one challenge after another with Iran and also, it should
be noted, had to manage the complex interaction within the P5+1
itself, there are too many risks, concerns, and ambiguities for us to
lend our support.
By abandoning the earlier negotiating posture of dismantling sanctions
in exchange for Iranian dismantlement of its nuclear infrastructure,
and instead replacing it with what is essentially a temporary freeze
on its program, the P5+1 has indeed validated Iran’s future status as
a nuclear threshold state, a point that President Obama himself
acknowledged in a media interview.
Given the nature of the Iranian regime and its defining ideology, AJC
cannot accept this prospect. It is too ominous, too precedent-setting,
and too likely to trigger a response from Iran’s understandably
anxious neighbors who may seek nuclear-weapons capacity themselves, as
well as, more immediately and still more certainly, advanced
conventional arms, adding an entirely new level of menace to the most
volatile and arms-laden region in the world. Surely, this cannot be in
America’s long-term security interests.
And by lifting the freeze on Iranian assets in relatively short order,
removing sanctions will surely trigger many visits to Tehran, as
evidenced already by German Vice Chancellor and Minister of Economy
Sigmar Gabriel’s desire to be among the first. Furthermore, ending the
ban on arms flow to Iran within five years and on missile technology,
which would help its ICBM program, within eight years, will benefit
the regime enormously — and without a demand that Iran change its
destabilizing and dangerous behavior. This includes its frequent calls
for “Death to America and Israel,” and its hegemonic ambitions in
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen. AJC cannot accept this
prospect, either.
We are told by the deal’s supporters that the only alternative to this
deal is war. We respectfully disagree. We do not support war against
Iran, nor have we ever advocated for the use of force, though we have
always believed in a credible military option as a way of convincing
Iran of our seriousness of purpose. But until recently, we were told
by P5+1 negotiators: “The alternative to a bad deal is no deal.” What
happened to that formulation, and why did it suddenly change?
We understand that opposing this deal raises important questions about
the future that no one can answer today with certainty, much as we
believe that, faced with strong American leadership, Iran would find
it in its own best interests to return to the negotiating table sooner
or later. But we know with greater certainty that this deal raises
still more ominous questions about the future.
Therefore, AJC opposes the deal and calls on Members of Congress to do the same.
In doing so, we wish to make two additional points.
First, we fully understand that passions run high on both sides of the
debate, but that should not be an excuse for personal attacks or
inflammatory statements having no factual basis, whether voiced by the
deal’s supporters or its opponents. What is needed is a full-blown and
respectful debate about the issues, and not ad hominem accusations.
And second, it is in the American strategic interest, now more than
ever, to maintain the closest possible links with our long-time allies
in the region, including Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the members of the
Gulf Cooperation Council. Their geography, which is immutable, places
them on the front line. Their ongoing political and security concerns
— sometimes expressed publicly, sometimes privately — need to be
carefully considered, both now and in the future. They need us, as,
yes, we need them.
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