Our Precarious Defenses in Europe There are fewer American soldiers protecting the Continent than there are New York City cops by Robert H. Scales
http://www.wsj.com/articles/our-precarious-defenses-in-europe-1448833504
For an old Cold Warrior the scene on a bright October afternoon was surreal: America’s Second Cavalry Regiment crossing a Romanian river on a Soviet-built tactical bridge assembled by the Romanian Army, while overhead Vietnam-era MiG 21s carried out mock attacks, with German-made antiaircraft guns manned by Romanian crews simulating the destruction of the intruding MiGs.
The symbolism of the river crossing brought home to me the precarious condition of the U.S. military presence in Europe. American armor crossed on Romanian bridges because the Army has no tactical bridging in Europe. Romanian antiaircraft guns at the crossing sites highlighted the fact that our Army has no mid- and low-level antiaircraft weapons to protect America’s ground forces in Europe.
The Second Cavalry’s lightly armored Stryker vehicles that crossed on Romanian bridges worked well in Afghanistan against the Taliban. But they would turn into burning coffins when confronting Russian tanks. Numbers tell an even more frightening story: At 30,000, there are fewer American soldiers protecting Western Europe, a piece of the planet that produces 46% of global GDP, than there are cops in New York City.
On Oct. 27, the day after the crossing, I attended the annual Conference of European Armies in Wiesbaden, Germany. The event brought together 26 NATO nations and 10 affiliated European nations including Ukraine, Georgia, Romania and Albania. The military chiefs of these “partner” nations universally feared intrusion by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his military. After Russia’s excursions in Georgia and Ukraine, every European military fears further Russian aggression.
Virtually all the nations at the conference are tightly bonded by the shared experience of Afghanistan. Most had sacrificed soldiers to support the American-led conflict. Tiny Georgia contributed two companies that suffered 30 killed and more than 300 wounded. Many of all ranks had served together. The U.S. Army commander in Europe, General Ben Hodges, had fought under both a German and a Danish commander. U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley greeted many NATO and affiliated army leaders whom he had known and served with in Afghanistan. The question heard throughout the conference was: What will Putin do next?
They all agreed that, thanks to two years of enormous sacrifice by the Ukrainian Army, Mr. Putin is not anxious to restart his march through Ukraine to the Black Sea. Russia’s costly military commitment in Ukraine may well be one motive behind Mr. Putin’s dispatch of Russian soldiers and materiel to Syria. The consensus among all present was that Mr. Putin’s most dangerous and perhaps most likely next move will be against the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
From a Russian perspective the geography of the region would make aggression there possible. Russia has the advantage of “interior lines” in the Baltic, meaning that Mr. Putin can move units to threaten the Baltics much faster than the U.S. and NATO can respond. The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad is the most heavily armed oblast, or province, in its erstwhile empire. It contains three Russian armored brigades, a huge naval base, several airfields and is loaded with the same electronic spying and spoofing materiel used against the Ukrainians.
Kaliningrad is a Russian wedge between Poland and Lithuania and is only a 95 kilometer tank ride from the Russian military protectorate of Belarus across the Suwalki Gap. In a single day a Russian column could move from the southern border of Belarus across the extreme southern tip of Lithuania and effectively cut off the Baltics from the rest of NATO. Russia’s antiship missiles and ships berthed in Kaliningrad would very quickly cut all sea communications routes to the Baltic states and in so doing trap the three small American light infantry companies currently training Baltic armies.
What should NATO do to deter such a move? Put heavy-armored American ground units into Eastern Europe within marching distance of the Baltics. Position a heavy-armored brigade in each Baltic state and two in neighboring Poland. All but two of the American brigades might be limited to prepositioned brigade “sets” of materiel in Europe with troops stationed in the U.S.
A quick-reaction force of dedicated Air Force cargo aircraft alerted immediately for the mission could move all these soldiers to Europe in less than a week. These forward-based brigades would be reinforced with supporting units that have proven essential in recent wars, to include heavy artillery and rockets, drones, attack helicopters, intelligence, electronic warfare units and sufficient ammunition and fuel to keep the force in the fight for weeks.
Moving existing materiel to Europe wouldn’t require a single new weapons program or any increase in existing manpower. From what I witnessed first hand I strongly believe that such a force properly positioned would create a deterrent sufficiently intimidating to keep Mr. Putin in his cage for a very long time.
Maj. Gen. Scales retired from active duty in 2000 as commandant of the Army War College.
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