Endgame in the Pacific In the war’s grim final months, the human cost of invading Japan weighed upon America’s leaders. James D. Hornfischer reviews ‘Implacable Foes’ by Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio. See note please
https://www.wsj.com/articles/endgame-in-the-pacific-1497043755
One of the reasons for my fascination with books about World War 11, is the fact that was the last war America fought for unconditional surrender. Shinto imperialism and barbarity, and Nazi aspirations and genocide ended with total surrender and the world changed forever. Wars since then- even the Korean War with so many casualties and fatalities ended with a parallel leaving the Kim thugs in charge- and the various Middle East wars have been incursions changing nothing……rsk
In April 1945, as German troops surrendered en masse to American forces wheeling through the Ruhr Valley, news from the western Pacific seemed equally hopeful: Landings on the island of Okinawa had been largely unopposed. It was a high-water mark for public optimism regarding the prospects for the unconditional surrender of Japan and the return, at last, of peace.
That month, a U.S. government bureau forecast that an economy shackled by the restrictions of war production would make a smooth transition to normalcy. Although unpopular controls such as the curfew on nightclubs and bans on horse racing would soon be lifted, industrialists and labor unions alike were pushing back against the Army’s voracious needs and the government’s far-reaching management of the economy. President Harry Truman dared hope that Japan could be forced to quit before the home front finally turned on him, imperiling the yearslong struggle to defeat Japan on terms set long ago by Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Then Germany surrendered, and the Japanese emperor’s Okinawa garrison showed its teeth. Those two developments threatened to change everything.
This startling, nearly forgotten story is well documented in “Implacable Foes,” a valuable and revealing study by Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio, historians at San Diego State and Villanova, respectively. The authors remind us how public weariness with the war and the difficulty of redeploying armies world-wide for a reckoning with Tokyo imperiled Truman’s plan to defeat Japan and avoid the type of economic disruptions that tested the nation after World War I.
Though the military campaigns carried out by the forces under Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Adm. Chester Nimitz from February 1944 forward are covered in this book, those oft-told tales are not the main event. The authors’ major contribution lies in bringing to life the turmoil of a home front “going sour,” as Secretary of War Henry Stimson put it, which pushed the finale of the Pacific campaign toward the precipice of possible failure or abandonment. Though that outcome was never in actual view, war planners did fear, as casualties mounted, what the authors call “a public psychology of complacency, slackening effort, and a drift of labor away from war work.” The special military advisor to the president, Adm. William D. Leahy, believed that at some point the clamor to bring the boys home could become irresistible.
From day one, Iwo Jima was a meat grinder. In late 1944 the volcanic isle had been so lightly defended that it could have been taken by a regiment. But by D-Day, Feb. 19, 1945, it had become a hive of stone. The Marines suffered more than 25,000 casualties in taking it. Though MacArthur used his well-cultivated relationships in the press to lobby otherwise, his own campaigns were equally costly.
That winter, MacArthur’s army in the Philippines was in the grip of crisis. The 32nd Division, having served there since November 1944, teetered at half-strength. By June, the larger Sixth Army’s “non-battle” losses from fatigue and illness would surpass its combat casualties, more than 93,000 overall. Said a veteran sergeant, “How much of this is flesh and blood expected to stand?”
In Washington, political leaders were having similar concerns. It was not at all clear that the climactic invasion of Japan could be successfully staged. High casualties made it critical to sustain an influx of replacement troops, but the shortage became acute as MacArthur prepared to liberate Manila. The Army was surging newly trained soldiers to Europe to replace losses suffered in the Ardennes. The Battle of the Bulge dented the order of battle drawn up for the invasion of Japan as deeply as the campaigns in the western Pacific did.
It may seem counterintuitive, but victory in Europe did no favors to commanders looking to drive the costly effort against Japan. After V-E Day, Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Marshall was alive to the need to crush Tokyo swiftly, for delay threatened the essential perishable commodities of momentum and national morale. But maintaining a fast pace exhausted soldiers, and the losses they suffered tended to dampen domestic political support.The battle for Okinawa turned for the worse shortly after the first reports of unopposed landings hit the papers. It was secured in June for a price of more than 49,000 U.S. killed, missing and wounded, a 35% casualty rate. On June 18, Truman approved Operation Olympic, as the landings in Kyushu (Japan’s southern-most home island) were known, and implicitly rejected the strategy of prolonged blockade and siege. At the same time, the political pressure to discharge veteran troops after V-E Day finally had its effect. Marshall developed a plan to bring some of the boys home. CONTINUE AT SITE
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