Allies Worry Over U.S. Public Opinion The gap between voters and foreign-policy elites shows little sign of closing. By Walter Russell Mead
https://www.wsj.com/articles/allies-worry-over-u-s-public-opinion-11551741006
There is no more important question in world politics than this: Will U.S. public opinion continue to support an active and strategically focused foreign policy? During the Cold War and for 25 years after, there was rarely any doubt. While Americans argued—sometimes bitterly—over the country’s overseas priorities, there was a broad consensus in both parties that sustained engagement was necessary to protect U.S. interests.
That consensus is more fragile today. Questions about the reliability of American commitments keep the lights burning late in foreign and defense ministries around the world. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo insists, as he said in Manila last week, that a Chinese attack on Philippine forces or territory in the South China Sea would activate Article 4 of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty. But will the American people honor the check that Mr. Pompeo has written on their behalf?
The best answer appears to be “maybe.” A recent poll from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 70% of Americans want the U.S. to take an “active part” in world affairs in the abstract. But in a 2018 Pew survey, only 32% said limiting China’s power should be an important long-term foreign-policy priority for the U.S.
Similarly, while a strong majority of Americans support membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, just over half of Americans would support military action in response to a hypothetical Russian invasion of Estonia, according to a recent Eurasia Group Foundation survey. The Kremlin studies such poll results carefully, and so do NATO allies on Russia’s borders.
Perspectives on defense are especially schizophrenic when partisanship comes into play. While 52% of Democrats believe that limiting Russian power should be a top national priority, most Democrats also say defense spending should be reduced.
To the extent that young voters’ attitudes forecast the political future, poll numbers suggest a continuing drift from Cold War-era ideas about America’s place in the world. Voters in their 20s and 30s are significantly less likely than older Americans to think that the U.S. is an exceptional nation, to support humanitarian interventions abroad or to think the U.S. should seek to limit the power of countries like Russia, China, North Korea and Iran.
Another trend that should concern internationalists is the growing gap between the foreign-policy views of elites and nonelites. Certain issues unite much of the public behind President Trump’s elite critics, like the importance of free trade, the need to improve relations with allies and the value of immigration to the U.S. But there remain large gaps over the proper scope of U.S. engagement between elites—both GOP and Democratic—and ordinary voters. CONTINUE AT SITE
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