Like Mercenaries throughout History, Prigozhin Became a Threat to the Man Who Hired Him With Dictators like Vladimir Putin, You Only Get One Try; Charles Lipson
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/08/24/mercenary-chief-prigozhin-dead-wagner-boss-plane-putin/
“Never strike a king,” Ralph Waldo Emerson once said, “unless you are sure you shall kill him.” Good advice, but it comes too late for Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian leader of the Wagner mercenary army.
Vladimir Putin, that old KGB man, already knew Emerson’s message, deep in his guts. He also knew the unstated part: if you try to kill the king and you fail, you will be the dead one.
And so Prigozhin was.
Prigozhin, once Putin’s ally, should have known the limits of their ties
The leader of the Russia’s most effective mercenary force had once been Putin’s chef and ally. He had the Kremlin’s support when he formed Wagner. He had it, too, when he led his soldiers in the grinding, brutal battle for the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, where Wagner lost tens of thousands of soldiers in the house-to-house fighting. As the fighting wore on, however, Prigozhin learned the limits of Putin’s support.
The Kremlin’s fear was that, if Prigozhin and his mercenaries got credit for this prominent victory in Bakhmut, Wagner’s success would undermine the prestige of the regular Russian army and ultimately threaten Putin’s own power.
Preventing that erosion is why the regular military’s two leaders, Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and military chief of staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov, ultimately denied Wagner the ammunition and supplies they needed to complete their victory. Then Shoigu and Gerasimov, presumably at Putin’s direction, tried to deny Wagner credit for taking the city.
Prigozhin’s Fatal Decision to March on Moscow
Prigozhin was furious at this betrayal and said so repeatedly on his widely-circulated social-media posts. When his PR campaign failed, Prigozhin took much more drastic—and ultimately fatal–action. He mobilized his troops to march on Moscow.
Prigozhin’s aggressive action illustrates the basic problem with all mercenary armies. They are loyal to their leader and not to the politician or nation that employs them. The same problem recurs when divisions of the regular army spend decades under the same leader. They transfer their loyalty from the state to their military leader.
The Domestic Danger Posed by All Armies, esp. Mercenaries:
They Can Turn on the Leader Who Hired Them
This problem is not unique to Russia or even to modern armies. It recurs throughout history. Caesar had no trouble convincing his troops to cross the Rubicon and march on Rome. During the Italian Renaissance, mercenary leaders, known as condottieri, were a constant threat to the city-states that hired them. One of them, Francesco Sforza, took over Milan and established a family dynasty there. During the Thirty Years War (1618-48), the great mercenary leader was Albrecht von Wallenstein, whose very success threatened the Holy Roman Emperor who hired him. A modern example was Stalin’s fear of his greatest general during World War II, Marshall Georgy Zhukov. After the war, Stalin forced him into retirement and seclusion. As soon as Zhukov was no longer needed to fight the Nazis, he was simply a threat to Stalin’s power.
Putin understands this logic thoroughly. He is shrewd enough—and paranoid enough—to see threats everywhere around him. That’s why Putin chose military leaders from marginalized ethnic groups; they aren’t candidates to lead Russia. That’s why he chose leaders who lack the military background or charisma to lead troops. Gerasimov couldn’t lead a march on Moscow if he tried.
Prigozhin was a far greater threat, and Putin knew it. If he had any doubts, they were removed when the mercenary leader, frustrated at his troops’ lack of support from the regular military, marched on Rostov-on-Don, the logistical hub for Russia’s war in southern and eastern Ukraine. Putin must have been shocked not only at the uprising but at the enthusiastic welcome Prigozhin received in Rostov-on-Don.
Prigozhin’s next move was to march north toward Moscow. He must have had private signals from key military and political leaders that they would support him. We can make that inference because his own band of troops was far too small to overcome concerted resistance in Moscow.
But those promises of support must have evaporated as the Wagner troops neared Moscow. We still don’t know the inside story, but we do know that Prigozhin stopped short of his goal, said he never intended to overthrow Putin, and ultimately given a “friendly” meeting with Putin to show their comradery.
It was all a lie. So was an informal live-and-let-live agreement Prigozhin made with Putin. As long as the Wagner leader lived, he would be a focal point for nationalist opposition. As long as his forces remained intact, they would be the kernel of a military coup.
Putin couldn’t allow that and, on Wednesday, he dealt with that threat. It lay dead in a field near Moscow, a smoking ruin.
Why Such a Visible Assassination? To Send a Message
Assuming Putin ordered the assassination (and we still don’t have definitive evidence), why did he do it so visibly?
The answer: To send a very public message, or rather two messages:
- “I’m in charge.” and
- “If you challenge me, I will kill you.”
He wanted all potential opponents in Russia to receive that message. That’s why he didn’t have Prigozhin poisoned or thrown out a window like dozens of other opponents. He wanted to parade his head on a pike, at least figuratively.
Lessons for US, Britain and NATO
What lessons will America, Britain, and their NATO allies draw from this?
① Putin is fearful of his grip on power and determined to kill off any threats. That’s why he also removed his most effective general in the Ukraine war, Sergei Surovikin. His ties to Prigozhin were too close. Putin clearly understand the endgame for all autocrats: strong man today, dead man tomorrow.
② Agreements with Putin are worthless, as Prigozhin was only the latest to find out. Putin will rip them up as soon as his short-term interests change.
③ Putin’s failed war of choice in Ukraine has destabilized his regime. He probably thinks he cannot survive an outright loss or even the loss of major territory like Crimea, the home of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. On the other hand, no Ukrainian government can survive politically if it concedes a permanent loss of territory in Crimea and possibly Donbas. It also knows that, without control over Crimea, its sea lines of communication are permanently threatened by Russia’s navy. Ukraine cannot rebuild its economy if it lacks secure control over its territory and its shipping lanes.
Lousy Prospects of a Compromise Deal on Ukraine
Even as some NATO partners tire of the war’s costs, the prospects a compromise solution are grim. Ukraine is determined to fight on. Putin’s invasion forged them into a coherent nation, including even the Russian-speaking areas. But that nation will need NATO’s guns, ammunition, plans, and military intelligence to win.
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