Why Is Hizballah Escalating? The terror group steps up its attacks despite deadly Israeli strikes. P. David Hornik

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Last October 8, one day after the October 7 massacre in southern Israel, Hizballah began firing projectiles into northern Israel. That situation—along with the possibility of a ground invasion by Hizballah’s Radwan force—necessitated an evacuation of about 60,000 Israelis from a 5-kilometer strip along the border to temporary lodging farther south in Israel, where they remain to this day.

Since that time the Israel–Hizballah exchange of hostilities across the border stayed on a relatively low flame and was perceived as a sideshow to the bigger conflict in Gaza. In recent weeks, though, Hizballah has sharply escalated its attacks. They include an increased use of explosive-laden drones, the first use of the heavy Falaq-2 rocket and of antiaircraft missiles, as well as strikes deeper into Israeli territory than before, reaching as far south as Nazareth and a suburb of Haifa.

In terms of casualties on both sides, Israel has had the upper hand—by far—throughout the conflict. On the Israeli side, 10 civilians and 15 soldiers have been killed; on the Hizballah side, the deaths number about 340 of its own fighters, about 60 members of other terror groups, and dozens of civilians. But instead of being deterred, Hizballah has lately been escalating. One question is where it leads; many think it’s leading inevitably to a much bigger war—and, possibly, very soon. The other question is why Hizballah is ramping up the hostilities to a level not seen since October; following are possible answers.

1.       Hizballah is enraged by Israeli strikes and is hitting back wildly and vengefully. Israel, with its superior air power and intelligence, has indeed been picking off numerous Hizballah commanders and operatives in airstrikes in recent weeks. It should be kept in mind, though, that the Israeli escalation was a response to the Hizballah escalation—and the former has not calmed the latter. Hizballah’s onslaught looks strategic rather than tactical.

2.       Hizballah—and its patron Iran—are aware of tensions and conflicting objectives in the Israel–US relationship and feel that Hizballah has a freer hand. In particular, the Biden administration’s suspension of a sizable arms shipment to Israel in May gave a very problematic signal of tentative, uncertain US support for Israel. Even if, according to some reports, the delivery of the withheld weapons has been resumed, it was a moment that resonated negatively in terms of Israeli, US, and Western interests in the Middle East and generally, and stepped-up Hizballah attacks soon followed.

3.       Related to the former, with elections approaching, the Biden administration is signaling a desperation to rein in Middle Eastern military conflict. It has kept persistently begging—the term, unfortunately, is accurate—Hamas to accept a ceasefire offer variously identified as Israeli, US, or both, and only keeps begging more desperately the more Hamas shows its obvious disdain for the offer. Meanwhile US–British strikes on the Houthis have also been kept on a low flame, without denting the Houthis’ harassment of international shipping that has been ongoing since November. Lately Washington has opted for financial pressure on the Houthis; how much it can succeed is yet to be seen.

This situation, too, is hardly lost on Hizballah, Iran, and their axis generally, and raises the sharp question of whether—if Israel were to launch a more ambitious offensive against Hizballah—the US would support it, and if not, whether Israel would be able to do it.

 

In other words, the first answer above is not persuasive; the second and third have much more weight. Added, now, to this difficult situation is a very bad move, by Israeli former chief of staff, defense minister, and war-cabinet member Benny Gantz, of taking himself and his party out of the governing coalition. The move appears certain to further erode Israeli unity at this critical juncture and further expose Israel to a chorus of accusations of conducting a “far-right policy” by fighting back against murderous aggression.

Tough times are ahead. To paraphrase Yeats, the worst are full of passionate intensity, while the best don’t seem to know what they’re doing.

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