The Dos and Don’s of Negotiating with Iran By Kenneth R. Timmerman

Shortly after then-Secretary of State John Kerry concluded talks with his Iranian counterpart that led to the 2015 nuclear agreement, the wizards at Google had already delivered judgment. When I typed in the phrase, “how not to buy a carpet” at Google images, the first result was a photo of the two foreign ministers and their aides, facing each other across the negotiating table in Lausanne.

 

The ever-smiling Mohammad Javad Zarif told Kerry three times they had a deal, but that he needed to go back to Tehran to run it by the “Supreme Leader.” And three times he came back, demanding more.

Donald Trump called the deal the United States finally signed, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), “the worst deal ever” and withdrew the United States from it in 2018. He was right.

 

The President’s Middle East special envoy, Steve Witcoff, recently admitted that he got “duped” by Hamas during negotiations in Qatar with Hamas-appointed Arab mediators.

Having worked in the Middle East as a war correspondent and investigative reporter for forty years, let me say it straight: if the Arabs managed to dupe Mr. Witcoff, the Iranians are going to take him to the cleaners.

 

So here are a few “do’s and dont’s” for Witcoff when he travels to Oman this weekend.

Rule #1: Always be prepared to walk out

 

 

The Iranians invariably win at negotiations because the other party wants the deal more than they do.

The media echo chamber run out of the Obama White House while Kerry was negotiating in Switzerland drummed into us the notion that it was the deal or war. The Iranians knew very well that wasn’t true. Obama was never prepared to go to war with Iran. He wasn’t even prepared to maintain sanctions on Iran if Kerry walked. That gave Kerry zero leverage.

 

President Trump has made very clear this time that if the Iranians don’t agree to fully dismantle their nuclear infrastructure, there will be “hell to pay.” That gives Witcoff substantial credibility from the moment he walks into the room. So does the pre-positioning of B2 “Spirit” bombers on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

Rule #2: No negotiations about negotiations

 

 

The Iranians love to talk about the size and shape of the table. And the participants. And the intermediaries. Witcoff must make clear that neither he nor the president finds their games amusing.

They get one shot at this. If they keep their foreign minister in an adjacent suite while the Omanis transmit messages back and forth, Witcoff should walk out. If they want negotiations to continue, they can crawl back.

Rule #3: Make the end state crystal clear from the beginning

The Iranians will attempt to redefine the subject of the negotiations from the get-go. They will say they are ready to resume where they left off with the JCPOA, and that the only reason they have been enriching uranium to 60% is because the U.S. walked out in 2018.

Witcoff’s response must be crystal clear: We are not here to discuss the JCPOA. We are here to discuss the dismantling of your nuclear infrastructure, just as we did with Qaddafi in 2004.

Rule #4: Don’t get bogged down in side issues.

Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi knows the nuclear file inside and out, as he was the lead legal expert in the previous round of negotiations. He will raise a host of side issues, such as America’s alleged failure to uphold its commitments under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the injustice of American sanctions, and the “bad faith” of the U.S. side.

Don’t get sidetracked. Nothing is on the table until Iran is ready to negotiate the dismantling of its nuclear weapons infrastructure, which includes the centrifuge enrichment plants in Nantanz and Fordo, its uranium hexafluoride plant, its centrifuge manufacturing workshops, its nuclear bomb design bureaux (and let’s not pretend they don’t exist), and the facilities it uses to produce the non-nuclear components of nuclear warheads.

Iran has been in violation of its NPT commitments since 2003, when its nuclear weapons program first became public. The UN Security Council passed five resolutions between 2006-2009 condemning Iran for those violations, starting with UNSC 1696 on July 31, 2006. Until it comes into full compliance with the NPT, it has no rights under the Treaty. Zero.

Rule #5: Verification is critical

In 2015, the Iranians snookered John Kerry and his team on verification, so much so that the apparent “concessions” the Iranians made became meaningless. The United States must be actively involved in verifying Iran’s compliance with this deal — and that means U.S. inspectors in Iran — or else there is no deal.

Once again, Witcoff must be prepared to walk out, especially when the Iranians let on they are so close to an agreement.

Rule #6: No security guarantees

The Iranians will point to Qaddafi as Exhibit A of what happens to a Third World leader when he gives up his nuclear weapons.

I was in Libya in March 2004 when Qaddafi loaded his uranium enrichment centrifuges and his long-range ballistic missiles onto a U.S. cargo ship in Tripoli harbor. (Ironically, I was there thanks to a U.S. congressional delegation led by Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) and Senator Joe Biden.)

Qaddafi wasn’t overthrown because he gave up his nuclear weapons infrastructure. He was overthrown because Obama and Hillary Clinton ignited the Arab spring and supported his Muslim Brotherhood opponents.

Don’t get sidetracked. The United States is not going to provide security guarantees to the Iranian regime against its internal opposition, or to protect it from Israel. If Iran wants to prevent Israeli counterstrikes, it can stop attacking Israel.

Rule # 7: No grand bargain

Iran will demand that the United States lift all sanctions, return all frozen assets, and lock itself into an international mechanism that will prohibit us from reimposing sanctions at a later date.

You are not negotiating a “grand bargain,” or the return of Iran to its place in the international council of nations. If Iran wants to talk about its support for international terrorist groups, its human rights abuses against its own citizens, or a resumption of trade with the United States, those are separate negotiations that may or may not take place in the future.

So for now, all except the specifically nuclear sanctions remain in place. The U.S. will continue to prohibit Iran from exporting its oil because that money is being used to support genocidal attacks against the Jewish people.

The bottom line:

So what does Iran get under this deal? A temporary reprieve from U.S. military action to destroy its nuclear weapons infrastructure. That is a temporary lifeline for the regime.

Witcoff must understand that and hold firm. The Iranians will squeal. They will complain. They will accuse us of behaving like a hegemon, depriving them of their “rights” to conduct nuclear research.

Let them. Because if they do not agree to Pres. Trump’s terms they won’t be squealing at all, at least, not for long.

Kenneth R. Timmerman was a guest lecturer on Iran at the Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy in Quantico for six years. His latest work of non-fiction, The Iran House: Tales of Revolution, Persecution, War, and Intrigue, was recently published by Bombardier Books.

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