Deter Beijing from Attacking Taiwan By Dan Blumenthal
https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2021/03/22/deter-beijing-from-attacking-taiwan/
Policies to keep great-power competition from becoming great-power conflict.
Over several decades, the People’s Republic of China has been coercing and intimidating Taiwan in an attempt to force “unification” of the de facto independent democratic island with the mainland. The U.S. has responded through mostly diplomatic means, working to help Taiwan avoid international isolation. But now the risk of a Sino–American military conflict over Taiwan is growing. Chinese Communist Party general-secretary Xi Jinping has stepped up his muscular rhetoric about “recovery” of what he views as lost Chinese territory, and his military is more ready than ever to act forcefully if called upon. But through coercive diplomacy the U.S. still has time to head off Chinese aggression. What is needed is a new diplomatic campaign backed by a quick strengthening of U.S. military posture.
On the matter of Taiwan, Xi is a dangerous man. His strategy for political survival inside the brutal, jungle-like CCP is to initiate constant political purges, mass campaigns to strengthen Communist Party ideology and discipline, crackdowns on dissent, and nationalistic adventures abroad, from Hong Kong to India. Taiwan is the logical next target, and Beijing is beating the drums of war.
On January 2, 2019, General-Secretary Xi declared that the annexation of Taiwan was necessary for China to achieve its “great rejuvenation” — his personal grand strategic ambition. Ending a commitment upon which the one-China policy was predicated, Xi also declared that China would not renounce the use of force to accomplish its Taiwan objectives. The CCP released a policy paper expanding on Xi’s claims. It said:
Solving the Taiwan problem and achieving complete national unification is in the fundamental interest of the Chinese. It is obviously necessary for achieving the great Chinese rejuvenation. . . . China must be unified and obviously will be. . . . If anyone splits Taiwan off from China, China’s military will pay any price to totally defeat them.
The People’s Liberation Army’s air force made its overflights and air patrols around Taiwan more frequent and invasive, and in 2020 Xi raised the stakes further by ordering PLA warplanes to frequently cross the median line across the Taiwan Strait. China’s foreign ministry confirmed a policy shift that attempted to effectively erase this imaginary line that had contributed to stability. While Xi is emboldened by his recent success in ending Hong Kong’s autonomy with little Western reaction, he also feels internal pressure to deliver nationalistic foreign-policy “wins” to distract from difficulties at home. History tells us that a frustrated but powerful country poses a special kind of danger.
This new danger to Taiwan is largely due to the success of one of the most ambitious peacetime military-modernization programs since the Cold War. After the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–96, China built a military that will soon boast the world’s largest naval fleet, the most lethal ballistic- and cruise-missile force, advanced integrated air defenses, and complex and sophisticated command, control, computer, communications, intelligence-reconnaissance, and surveillance systems. It has made great strides in using information technologies to enhance its ability to conduct joint operations.
Alarmingly, China’s ability to invade Taiwan has also grown. The People’s Liberation Navy and Marine Corps could attempt a sudden, full-scale amphibious assault backed by air and rocket forces. The PLA is improving and adding to its fleet of amphibious landing ships and conducting realistic training in landing on islands. Before any such operation, China would likely unleash its suite of “counter-intervention” capabilities, including ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, surface ships, and sophisticated anti-aircraft capabilities, to devastate the many static U.S. forward-deployed forces based near China. This would be followed by a barrage of missile and airstrikes against Taiwan, to prepare for an invasion.
The United States is still hoping that China is not yet ready to execute a full amphibious invasion, one of the most complex military operations. But that hope is eroding. For a long time, U.S. strategic planners focused on scenarios in which China would use lesser forms of force to intimidate and coerce the island to come to favorable terms. It is still possible that China will again use its coast guard and maritime militia as it did to gain control over South China Sea territories. For example, “nonmilitary” ships could seize one of Taiwan’s outlying islands. These are operations short of war and meant to gain strategic advantage without provoking an adversary’s military response. China would also unleash its lethal cyber- and information-warfare capabilities against Taiwan to undermine public confidence in Taiwan’s leadership by conducting disinformation campaigns and disabling communications systems. Though these short-of-war scenarios are troubling, they would not necessarily result in unification. Taiwan could survive such a campaign, and the United States would still be able to assist its ally with military and other relief. A successful invasion, on the other hand, would end Taiwan’s democracy and de facto independence.
But even as the PRC’s ability to invade grows, Beijing is not fully confident in its ability to conduct an invasion, and the U.S. can better prepare to stop one. As noted, amphibious assaults are extraordinarily difficult, and military experts stress that invading Taiwan would require the largest and most complex amphibious assault in history. And PLA leaders are aware of their shortcomings, according to scholar Mark Cozad. PLA publications highlight weaknesses in joint-command structures and in amphibious, airborne, and logistics capabilities that would be necessary in a campaign to occupy Taiwan.
U.S. strategy should aim to undermine mainland China’s confidence that it could execute a large-scale amphibious landing in Taiwan. And the U.S. needs to engage in its own diplomatic campaign backed by a more robust force posture.
For this to succeed, Washington should acknowledge that the PRC has abandoned any strategic ambiguity about its willingness and capability to use force against Taiwan, and say that, therefore, the U.S. will defend Taiwan if attacked.
A new U.S. diplomacy should be guided by awareness that an ambiguous defense commitment does not achieve deterrence of war. The U.S. has arguably most often gone to war when its adversaries, from Emperor Hirohito to Saddam Hussein, were unsure of its commitment to fight. (The former is the more apt comparison to the PRC.) China has built the capabilities to deliver a devastating blow to frontline U.S. forces. If attacked in this fashion, U.S. leadership would have to decide whether it is worth it to mobilize a military capable of fighting its way back into Asia. The only way to undermine China’s confidence in that strategy is by enhancing the U.S. military and diplomatic position in forward-deployed positions in Asia.
As the U.S. brings its declared policy on Taiwan’s defense in line with its strategic interests, a more lethal military posture should back up the new commitment. There is consensus among military experts that the U.S. urgently needs to enhance its firepower around the strait. Prominent defense experts have called for more long-range munitions throughout Guam, Japan, the Philippines, and other Pacific islands so that the U.S. military could attack waves of Chinese amphibious landing and air-assault troops. Better intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance is urgently needed to track PLA movements and lessen the risk of a surprise that would be a fait accompli. Beijing cannot think that it has a chance to launch a successful surprise attack.
A set of major, high-profile moves to enhance U.S. military posture would get China’s attention. They should be accompanied by a stronger push for allies such as Australia and Japan to join in Taiwan-centered contingency planning. But the U.S. should also reorder its diplomacy with China directly. Washington needs to engage in “high diplomacy” with the PRC — diplomacy that discusses issues of war and peace. Secondary and tertiary issues, such as climate change and the always elusive search for cooperation on nonproliferation, are given too high a place in Washington’s China policy. The creation of such bilateral initiatives as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in the earliest part of this century diluted the focus of high-level diplomacy: Every U.S. cabinet member with even a passing interest in China had a seat at the diplomatic table. There certainly should be forums to discuss economic and trade issues, and the U.S. will still have ample opportunity to make its views on human rights known.
But great-power competition needs great-power diplomacy to keep competition from turning into conflict. This diplomacy would be conducted by the smallest number of U.S. leaders possible: the secretary of state, the national-security adviser, and the president. The U.S. may not be able to convince Xi to change anything fundamental about his troubling policy direction, but through new diplomatic and military moves it could focus his attention on avoiding conflict over Taiwan.
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