The goal of American foreign policy should be to make our friends more secure and our adversaries less secure. The balance of countries then have to decide how they want to position themselves. A successful policy will have tactical goals that fit into a larger strategic picture. The American attack on Syria’s al Shayrat military air base fits squarely into the rubric.
The UK, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Japan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Poland approved publicly. So did Democrats Dick Durbin, Ben Cardin, Chuck Schumer, Elizabeth Warren, and Nancy Pelosi. Opposed were Russia, Syria, Iran, and Bolivia (keep reading). China and Sweden made statements that hedged. Among the more odd responses, Iraqi Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr called on Assad to resign, and MSNBC host Lawrence O’Donnell called it a “false flag” operation, planned by President Trump and Vladimir Putin to help Trump prove he isn’t pro-Russian.
The first Russian response — after a furious announcement that they were tearing up the deconfliction agreement with the U.S. in Syria (they quickly thought better of it) — was to report that planes had flown from the base, so the U.S. attack had been a failure. Not so. Photos from the UK Daily Mail clearly show that hangars, fuel storage, airplanes, and service buildings were destroyed, confirming the Pentagon’s assessment. An Israeli report indicated that 58 of 59 Tomahawks hit. Flying some planes to al Shayrat and rolling them down abandoned runways is typical Russian obfuscation — the planes didn’t come from there, can’t stay there, can’t be maintained there, and can’t be refueled there. As punishment, the strike was a success.
If the tactical goal was met, what about the strategic ones? The Trump administration had announced that America’s priority in Syria would be the ouster of ISIS rather than the removal of Bashar Assad. Does the attack change that? Does it mean “regime change” is back on the table? Is the U.S. about to enter the Syrian civil war?
Not necessarily. Ambassador Haley’s comment that no political solution is possible with Assad does not mean that the U.S. is looking for a military solution. We faced a violation of international law that constituted an international emergency.
Not because of the numbers — more than 400,000 Syrians have already been killed, 11 million are displaced internally and externally, and life expectancy has declined by more than a decade. (U.S. comparables would be 5.6 million dead and 154 million total refugees – factors of 14.) Chemical weapons have been outlawed precisely because the world has generally agreed that they are uniquely hideous and terrifying. The appearance of CW threatens one of the world’s few consensus points.
Which is to say, the consensus on CW was actually shattered in 2013-14 with President Obama’s “red lines” and “game changers.” But then a different consensus coalesced around the fiction that Syrian chemical capability had been eliminated by a U.S.-Russian joint operation. Voices of disbelief were few and far between –- no one wanted to take on Putin or Obama. One result was to embolden Assad and his patrons. The past three years have seen Syrian and Russian strikes on relief convoys and civilians, including the use of chlorine –- though not nerve gas –- to pursue their campaign against Syrian Sunni Muslims.
