Officials underestimated complexities of setting up a rebel ground force amid chaos of war.
To build a rebel army, the Pentagon asked Syrian commanders last winter to nominate their best fighters. U.S. military officers spent more than a month checking each one for criminal or terrorist connections. Those who made the cut were sent to screening centers where they were questioned by American, Jordanian and Turkish officers. Then they waited, sometimes for days.
Fighters who made it to the screening centers were confused about the mission. When they learned what it was, many left. Others were found unfit, including one who showed up with open gunshot wounds. Under pressure to show operational success, the Pentagon started in July to field smaller groups than it wanted and watched from the sidelines as fighters fought the wrong enemy, or handed over equipment to al Qaeda or melted into Syria’s chaos.
The Pentagon’s effort to stand up a moderate rebel army, which would give the U.S. ground forces to fight Islamic State, has struggled since its inception to meet even its own modest goals, according to an account based on interviews with current and former U.S. officials as well as rebels who were part of the effort.
Officials now acknowledge they underestimated the complexities on the ground.
The program’s early stumbles, which follow problems with a similar Central Intelligence Agency effort, have reduced American military and diplomatic influence and left an opening for Russia—a long-standing Syrian ally—to ramp up its military assistance for the country’s embattled leader, Bashar al-Assad.
