The Proposed Resolution is more about what he won’t do against the Islamic State than what he will.
The authorization for the use of military force against the Islamic State that the Obama administration sent Congress this week is not worthy of the name. Its language is far more about what the president won’t do against the terrorist army that controls much of Syria and Iraq — limits on ground troops and a sunset provision for the authorization after three years — than what he will do. Congress should reject it.
If the threat of ISIS is as dire as the president says it is in the preamble of his resolution, if ISIS really does pose “a grave threat to the people and territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria, regional stability, and the national security interests of the United States and its allies and partners,” if ISIS really does “intend to conduct terrorist attacks internationally, including against the United States, its citizens, and interests,” then not only does the president already have the authority to strike granted to him by Article II of the Constitution and the 2001 and 2002 war resolutions, he also should not cavil or hesitate in unleashing every means at his disposal to confront and defeat the enemy. Making war is exactly what Obama should have been doing at least since last June when ISIS raised the black flag over the Iraqi city of Mosul.
Yet the urgency and drama with which the president and his advisers describe the actions and intentions of ISIS is remarkably disproportionate to their campaign against it so far: 2,600 U.S. troops in Iraq to act as advisers to the Iraqis and Kurds, a rather desultory campaign of airstrikes that has failed to degrade ISIS seriously, an admission from the vice president that ISIS probably won’t be dislodged from its redoubt in Syria because “there are no boots on the ground,” and a dispiriting, academic, wishy-washy attempt by U.S. defense bureaucrats to figure out “what makes the Islamic State so dangerous,” as well as the typical self-congratulation and smarm for assembling and maintaining an “international coalition” of allies most of whom do nothing.