About the Author: Louis René Beres (Ph.D., Princeton, 1971) is professor of political science and international law at Purdue University and the author of many books and articles dealing with international relations and strategic studies.
Editor’s Note: A somewhat longer version of the following article first appeared in The Jewish Press more than 25 years ago. Not only is it remarkably prescient, it is as relevant now as it was then. It is especially important at this particular moment, when 105 retired and reservist senior IDF officers have signed a letter calling publicly on Prime Minister Netanyahu to “lead” in negotiating for a Palestinian state.
February 1989
A pair of prominent Israeli commentators recently pointed out that continued control of the territories would have grave consequences for Israel’s security. In this connection, Yehoshafat Harkabi, a former chief of military intelligence, argues in his newest book,Israel’s Fateful Hour, that a refusal to end “occupation” of the West Bank and Gaza will produce escalating terrorism and further incentives for war by neighboring Arab states. Abba Eban, foreign minister of Israel from 1966 to 1974, insists in a January 2, 1989 editorial inThe New York Times(“Israel, Hardly the Monaco of the Middle East”), that Israel would have nothing to fear from an independent “Palestine.” Such a state, he claimed, “would be the weakest military entity on earth.”
In these assessments, Harkabi is certainly correct, but nowhere does he compare the risks to Israel of an ongoing “occupation” with those of a Palestinian state. If he had offered such a comparison, perhaps he would have understood that continuing Israeli administrative control of Judea/Samaria/Gaza would certainly have its risks, but that a bordering state of Palestine would be far worse. As for Mr. Eban, he is wrong altogether.
If there were to be an Arab-ruled state in Judea/Samaria/Gaza, its particular danger to Israel would lie less in its own army than in the assorted insurgents that would soon shelter themselves in “Palestine.” To suggest that the principal risks to Israel could be ascertained by simply comparing the Israeli army to the far more modest forces of this 23rd Arab statewould assume an incorrectly static condition in the new enemy country, one that would offer only the “best case” scenario for Israel.
These suggestions are hardly in Jerusalem’s best interests. Israel is not “the Monaco of the Middle East,” but neither would Palestine be as benign a mini-state as Abba Eban suggests. Before Israel can reasonably conclude that the so-called occupation is intolerable, its leaders will first have to determine whether it is actually less tolerable than Palestinian statehood. If it isn’t less tolerable, then rationality would require continuing administrative control, however painful, costly, and unfortunate. And such rationality would not even take into account the overwhelmingly all-important fact that Judea and Samaria are inherent parts of the Jewish state under authoritatively binding international law