The West has been viewing the Islamic State as a Mideastern problem. It is our problem.
‘Deal with the Rafidah [derogatory term for Shia Muslims], al Salul [derogatory term for Saudi royalists] . . . Dismember their limbs. Snatch them as groups and individuals. Embitter their lives and make them occupied with themselves instead of us. Be patient and do not hasten. Soon, Allah willing, the vanguards of the Islamic State will reach you.” So spoke Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-declared caliph of the Islamic State, in an audiotape released yesterday.
Puncturing reports of his demise in U.S. air strikes last weekend, al-Baghdadi released this new message of hate, in which he mentions events that have occurred since his supposed death. Like his July sermon in Mosul, this latest submission blends Koranic quotes with a litany of threats. A few call for particular attention.
“Celebrate, Muslims, for we give you good news by announcing the expansion of the Islamic State3…#to the lands of al-Haramayn [Saudi Arabia] and Yemen . . . to Egypt, Libya, and Algeria.”
Here, al-Baghdadi is celebrating recent pledges of fealty by various Salafi jihadist groups. And this recruitment illustrates a strategic reality that President Obama and other Western leaders have been neglecting: The Islamic State (I.S.) poses an urgent and spreading threat. Believing I.S. must be defeated in Iraq first, and then in Syria, the Obama administration ignores the fact that I.S. wages war on both physical and ideological battlefields.
These two battlefields link in a cycle of support of al-Baghdadi’s growing power. With each operational victory on the battlefield — or beheading of a Westerner – Islamic State earns another prize of ideological propaganda. In turn, this propaganda recruits new fighters and supporters around the world. I.S.’s operational capability thus grows as a response.
Having survived media speculation about his death (an operational victory in and of itself), al-Baghdadi has thus reinforced his credibility as a caliph under Allah’s ordained protection. Believing this, and witnessing I.S.’s withstanding of the coalition, jihadists are increasingly viewing al-Baghdadi as the rightful leader of their global cause. And so, they’re turning to his banner. As I predicted last year (see point 5 here), Egypt’s political situation makes it vulnerable to the charismatic existential purpose al-Baghdadi offers. This is equally true in Libya and Pakistan. Mythology is central to Salafi jihadism, and al-Baghdadi seems to embody this mythology.