There have been wild reports that the United States is considering a “bloody nose” preemptive attack of some sort on North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Such rumors are unlikely to prove true. Preemptive attacks usually are based on the idea that things will so worsen that hitting first is the only chance to decapitate a regime before it can do greater damage.
But in the struggle between Pyongyang and Washington, who really has gotten the upper hand?
With its false happy face in the current Winter Olympics, North Korea thinks it is winning the war of nerves. Yet its new nuclear missile strategy is pretty transparent. It wants to separate South Korea’s strategic interests from those of the United States, with boasts—backed by occasional missile nuclear tests—that it can take out West Coast cities.
Pyongyang could then warn its new frenemy, Seoul, that the United States would never risk its own homeland to keep protecting South Korea. Thus it would supposedly be wiser for Koreans themselves, in the spirit of Olympic brotherhood, to settle their own differences. A failed but nuclear North Korea ultimately would dictate the terms of the relationship to a successful but non-nuclear South Korea.
North Korea might even insincerely offer to dismantle some of its nuclear assets if the United States would just pull out its forces from the demilitarized zone at the 38th parallel. This strategy would also send the message to the United States that it should have little interest risking a nuclear exchange over a distant and largely internal Korean matter.