Since 1963’s nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Moscow’s policy seems to be comply if convenient, otherwise violate.
On July 29, the Obama administration announced that Russia has violated its obligation under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty “not to possess, produce or flight test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to 5,500 kilometers; or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.” The administration’s sudden candor is welcome. Yet its new compliance reportalleging that the Russians tested a missile prohibited under the INF treaty—doesn’t address other apparent treaty violations.
The INF violation fits into a long pattern of Soviet-Russian misbehavior that can only be described as “compliance if convenient.” Moscow appears to observe arms-control commitments when convenient but violates them when not. This contrasts sharply with America’s scrupulous adherence to the letter and often the supposed “spirit” of treaty commitments, long after Moscow has ceased to do so.
Unclassified presidential and State Department reports have documented Moscow’s violation of all the major arms-control agreements, particularly those limiting nuclear arms and testing. Moscow violated the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty shortly after it came into force, when Soviet nuclear tests vented radioactive debris beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union. Washington did not publicly address most treaty violations. Over time the U.S. appears rarely to have threatened any real consequences for Moscow’s noncompliance—perhaps helping to explain why Russia violates treaties with such abandon.
One exception was President Reagan, who presented a refreshingly realistic take in 1982: “Simply collecting agreements will not bring peace. Agreements genuinely reinforce peace only when they are kept. Otherwise, we are building a paper castle that will be blown away by the winds of war.” Reagan followed up with annual reports that depicted the scope and significance of Soviet violations.