RUTHFULLY YOURS

13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi is not just an entertaining movie, it’s a 144-minute rebuttal to everything the Obama administration has been saying about the attack since it took place on September 11, 2012.

The “true story” of Benghazi, as told by the secret soldiers, is a powerful rebuke to the “tall tales” that were told by the White House, the State Department and their defenders. There was no “fog of war” that prevented the Department of Defense from sending military assets to Benghazi — just a foggy narrative that was created by the commander in chief and secretary of state to explain the debacle without looking weak and feckless two months before an election.

The movie is based on the book of the same name, written by Boston University journalism professor Mitchell Zuckoff with the five CIA contractors who were on the ground in Benghazi that night: Jack Silva, Mark “Oz” Geist, John “Tig” Tiegen, Kris “Tanto” Paronto, and Dave “Boon” Benton.

Doctor Zhivago was transformed during the Cold War from a Siberian soap opera into a worldwide symbol of resistance to tyranny. How a competent but unexceptional novel came to achieve this status is a story far more interesting than the book itself
Helen Andrews

The Zhivago Affair: The Kremlin, the CIA, and the Battle over a Forbidden Book
by Peter Finn & Petra Couvée
Vintage, 2015, 368 pages, $22.99

Twilight of the Eastern Gods
by Ismail Kadare
Grove Press, 2014, 224 pages, $29.99

When Doctor Zhivago reached number one on the New York Times best-seller list in November, 1958, the book it displaced from the top spot was Lolita. Nabokov was not pleased. He did not think much of Boris Pasternak (left) as a novelist, and to make matters worse, he felt bound to keep his low opinion to himself for fear of seeming jealous. “Had not Zhivago and I been on the same ladder,” he griped in a private letter, “I would have been glad to demolish that trashy, melodramatic, false, and inept book, which neither landscaping nor politics can save from my wastepaper basket.”

Nabokov was right that Doctor Zhivago, as literature, is nothing to crow about—not that the author of Lolita was in a position to look down his nose at a book for owing its success to extra-literary considerations. Pasternak does not rank with Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. He nonetheless deserves to be classed with such perfectly creditable writers as, say, Margaret Mitchell. Indeed, Gone with the Wind may be the closest thing to an English-language equivalent of Doctor Zhivago: a sweeping romantic epic set against the backdrop of a civil war, with enough sympathy shown for the losing side to attract the ire of the politically correct. Both books transitioned very well to the big screen, and in neither case was that entirely a compliment to the literary quality of the source material.

Yet during the Cold War Doctor Zhivago was transformed from a Siberian soap opera into a worldwide symbol of resistance to tyranny. The story of how this occurred is the subject of The Zhivago Affair: The Kremlin, the CIA, and the Battle over a Forbidden Book by Peter Finn and Petra Couvée.

pasternak PW coverThe book’s road to international fame began in 1956, when the Khrushchev thaw led Pasternak to hope that his newly completed first novel might find a Soviet publisher, despite its criticisms of Bolshevik excesses. His friend Kornei Chukovsky, who had more experience with the Moscow literary bureaucracy, was less naive. He knew that Doctor Zhivago would be suppressed, thaw or no thaw. But he also knew that Khrushchev would be wary of handing the West an easy propaganda victory. According to the gossip Chukovsky had gathered by September, “the current plan is as follows: to stem all nasty rumours (both here and abroad) by putting the novel out in three thousand copies—thereby making it inaccessible to the masses—and at the same time proclaiming that we are placing no obstacle in Pasternak’s path”.

On December 16, 1944 three German armies (more than a quarter-million troops) launched the deadliest and most desperate battle of the war in the west in the rugged, and freezing Ardennes. American units were caught unprepared and fought desperate battles to stem the German advances. The Battle of the Bulge, so-called because the Germans created a “bulge” around the area of the Ardennes forest in pushing through the American defensive line, was the largest fought on the Western front.

The Germans threw 250,000 soldiers into the initial assault, 14 German infantry divisions guarded by five panzer divisions-against a mere 80,000 Americans. Their assault came in early morning at the weakest part of the Allied line, an 80-mile poorly protected stretch of hilly, woody forest (the Allies simply believed the Ardennes too difficult to traverse, and therefore an unlikely location for a German offensive). Between the vulnerability of the thin, isolated American units and the thick fog that prevented Allied air cover from discovering German movement, the Germans were able to push the Americans into retreat.

One particularly effective German trick was the use of English-speaking German commandos who infiltrated American lines and, using captured U.S. uniforms, trucks, and jeeps, impersonated U.S. military and sabotaged communications. The ploy caused widespread chaos and suspicion among the American troops as to the identity of fellow soldiers–even after the ruse was discovered. Even General Omar Bradley himself had to prove his identity three times–by answering questions about football and Betty Grable–before being allowed to pass a sentry point.

The battle raged for three weeks, resulting in a massive loss of American and civilian life. Nazi atrocities abounded, including the murder of 72 American soldiers by SS soldiers in the Ardennes town of Malmedy. Historian Stephen Ambrose estimated that by war’s end, “Of the 600,000 GIs involved, almost 20,000 were killed, another 20,000 were captured, and 40,000 were wounded.” The United States also suffered its second-largest surrender of troops of the war: More than 7,500 members of the 106th Infantry Division capitulated at one time at Schnee Eifel. The devastating ferocity of the conflict also made desertion an issue for the American troops; General Eisenhower was forced to make an example of Private Eddie Slovik, the first American executed for desertion since the Civil War.

A crucial German shortage of fuel and the gallantry of American troops fighting in the frozen forests of the Ardennes thwarted Hitler’s ambitions. Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s remarkable feat of turning the Third Army ninety degrees from Lorraine to relieve the besieged town of Bastogne was the key to thwarting the German counteroffensive. The Battle of the Bulge was the costliest action ever fought by the U.S. Army, which suffered over 100,000 casualties.

On January 12, 1045, the Nazis began their retreat and the battle ended on January 25,1945.

Presidential rhetoric is much less effective in a final year, after a leader’s statements and approach have become rooted in reality. And in his final State of the Union address, Barack Obama will have a tough time persuading a skeptical nation that the world he inherited eight years ago is somehow more manageable and secure as a result of his efforts.

In his speech Tuesday, Mr. Obama is likely to claim success on a number of issues. He has reached out to Cuba, concluded an agreement to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and negotiated a trade accord with Pacific nations as well as a historic framework on climate change. But all of these accomplishments are works in progress; the first two depend on changes in the behavior of authoritarian regimes; the latter on (uncertain) congressional approval and the compliance of numerous international actors. The success or failure of these endeavors won’t be determined until long after Mr. Obama leaves the White House, and a Republican successor might well try to undermine, delay, or alter some or all of them.

When it comes to terror attacks at home, Mr. Obama will seek to reassure but it’s going to be a heavy lift. Two-thirds of the public disapproves of his approach to Islamic State. Mr. Obama can point to recent successes by the Iraqi army against ISIS in Ramadi, but that victory is less a turning point than a successful turn in a long and winding road. The image of a president who underestimated the rise of ISIS and has been reluctant to use more military muscle is increasingly criticized by the many Republicans running for president. Mr. Obama’s former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, has sought to distance herself from the president on the issue of a “no-fly zone” for Syria. Fair or not, more San Bernardino-style attacks, a Paris-like assault, or the downing of a U.S. commercial airliner could undermine Mr. Obama’s foreign-policy legacy.

The Wall Street Journal’s Jay Solomon published a thorough report last Friday about how President Obama’s Iran deal has strengthened the hand of Iran’s hardliners. What is most breathtaking in the story is the degree to which American policy is divorced from reality.

How could the deal, which injects over $100 billion (probably way over that amount) into the Tehran regime’s coffers, have done anything but strengthened the hardliners’ hand? Of course it could not. Yet Obama’s policy walks an incoherent line between conceding that fact and wishfully thinking it were not so. Thus, Mr. Solomon writes,

The Obama administration’s nuclear deal was intended to keep Iran from pursuing an atomic bomb, and raised hope in the West that Tehran would be nudged toward a more moderate path.

U.S. and European officials had hoped the nuclear accord would broaden cooperation with Tehran, and empower Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to promote democratic change. He was elected in 2013 on a platform to end the nuclear standoff and build bridges to the West.

As much as $100 billion in frozen revenues are expected to return to Iran after sanctions are lifted, which U.S. officials said could happen in coming weeks. The White House hoped the cash windfall would aid Mr. Rouhani’s political fortunes.

To summarize: you are to understand from this that the administration and its allies in the P5+1 negotiations over the deal believed that the deal would (a) moderate the regime’s behavior (notwithstanding that the more aggressively Iran behaved, the more inclined Obama was to appease it), and (b) strengthen the position of the purportedly moderate, reformist president Rouhani (notwithstanding that he is only president because he was allowed to run by the Shiite ayatollahs who actually control the country, and who he has made a career of faithfully serving).

Yet, at the same time, Solomon reports:

Iranian academics close to Mr. Rouhani are increasingly concerned Mr. Khamenei will use the money and diplomatic rewards [from the deal] to entrench hard-line allies, at the expense of the president.

Many of the companies about to be removed from international blacklists are part of military and religious foundations, including some that report directly to Mr. Khamenei. Those firms could be the first to benefit from the rush of international businesses looking to profit from the lifting of sanctions.

Moreover, we learn that:

“The guiding assumption was that Iran would not moderate its behavior,” said Rob Malley, President Barack Obama ’s top Mideast adviser. “The president considered [it] absolutely critical to get this nuclear deal because we had no assessment that in the foreseeable future, Iran would change its approach.”

In the summer of 1776, the celebrated diarist James Boswell visited the Edinburgh home of David Hume, where the philosopher lay dying. Hume, atypically thin and “ghastly” in pallor, was nevertheless “placid.” Interrogated by Boswell, he affirmed his view that the afterlife was an “unreasonable fancy.” With “death before his eyes,” Boswell reported, Hume blithely predicted his own annihilation. “I maintained my faith,” wrote Boswell, but “left him with impressions which disturbed me for some time.”

This scene often serves as a miniature representation of Hume’s career. Boswell’s watery piety crashes against Enlightenment reason. Superstition flinches before knowledge. The sang-froid of Hume’s godlessness amazed contemporaries, and modern atheists have treasured the tale.

James A. Harris’s “Hume: An Intellectual Biography” punctures most of this mythology. Though an atheist, Hume was nowhere near as dogmatic as his current admirers. He was certainly not a rationalist. His reputation for philosophical intrepidity, furthermore, has been overblown.

In a climate where just saying “Benghazi” can hint at a political agenda, Michael Bay’s new film “13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi” seems headed into an ideological skirmish that the director swears he wants no part of.

The movie “doesn’t get political at all,” says Mr. Bay, who directed the “Transformers” movies and “Pearl Harbor.” “We show you what happened on the ground. It was written with the men who were there.”

The drama, which opens Jan. 15, recreates the chaotic Sept. 11, 2012, attack on an American diplomatic compound and a CIA station in Benghazi, Libya. Militants killed four Americans, including Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens. Inquiries into what went wrong have dogged Democratic presidential hopeful Hillary Clinton, who as the Secretary of State at the time oversaw the diplomatic corps.

The movie isn’t about the aftermath, Mr. Bay says. The 50-year-old director wanted to make a tense film about American military heroes who rose to the challenge of a deadly sneak attack—something he has done before on a bigger budget. “Pearl Harbor” cost around $140 million in 2001 and made the Guinness Book of World Records for its massive explosions.
From left, John Krasinski, James Badge Dale and director Michael Bay on the set of ‘13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi.’ ENLARGE
From left, John Krasinski, James Badge Dale and director Michael Bay on the set of ‘13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi.’ Photo: Paramount Pictures

“It took 3½ months to set up one explosion, seven hundred events going off on seven ships, 20 planes in the air. The good old days!” he says.

“13 Hours” came in just under $50 million.

“I didn’t want all the expensive toys,” Mr. Bay says. “It was about shooting it very raw, over the shoulder of guys to make it feel like you are really there. Everything that I have learned from many, many soldiers is the confusion of warfare and how everything goes wrong. You kind of feel that in the movie.”

Of course there’s also a commercial aim, that “13 Hours” might follow the path of another January release about modern warfare, “American Sniper.” Made for about $40 million, “Sniper” opened widely last January and reached $350 million in domestic box office, becoming the highest-grossing war movie of all time and the biggest-grossing January movie ever.

The Obama administration appears surprised by the sudden eruption of Saudi-Iranian hostility after the Saudi government executed Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr and the Iranians responded by organizing/sponsoring/approving an attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran. Both sides have walked the rhetoric back just a bit in the last day or two.

The U.S. administration remonstrated both sides, but its most public worry appears to be that events would get in the way of brokering a peace agreement in Syria. State Department Spokesman John Kirby said, “What we want to see is tensions caused by these executions reduced, diplomatic relations restored, so that the leadership in the region can focus on other pressing issues… We have consistently urged everyone to deescalate tensions.”

“The secretary is very concerned with the direction this thing is going,” said another one senior official. “It’s very unsettling to him that so many nations are choosing not to engage. With so much turmoil in the region, the last thing we need is for people not to be having conversations.”

A former Obama White House Middle East adviser told Al-Monitor. “To the degree that people hopefully wanted to see the Vienna process succeed, it required that Iran and Saudi Arabia be willing to sit at the same table and talk about a cease-fire and political process… Our approach to the region has depended on a Saudi-Iran modus vivendi. That is all blown out of the water, at least for now.”

It is now so easy for the Republicans to blame Clinton and Obama for North Korea’s nuke rattling, and while they certainly deserve plenty of blame, George Bush(2) and his Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice should also share the blame. This is a column written by Rice, who was as deluded as Madeleine Halfbright in facing down the nasty Papa King.

Diplomacy Is Working on North Korea By Condoleezza Rice June 2008
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121443815539505367
North Korea will soon make a declaration of its nuclear programs, facilities and materials. This is an important, if initial, step and we will demand that it be verifiable as complete and accurate.

Amidst all the focus on our diplomatic tactics, it is important to keep two broader points in mind. One, we are learning more about Pyongyang’s nuclear efforts through the six-party framework than we otherwise would be. And two, this policy is our best option to achieve the strategic goal of verifiably eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and programs.

North Korea now faces a clear choice about its future. If it chooses confrontation ; violating international law, pursuing nuclear weapons, and threatening the region ; it will face serious consequences not only from the United States, but also from Japan, South Korea, China and Russia, as it did in 2006 after testing a nuclear device.

If, however, North Korea chooses cooperation ; by fulfilling its pledge from the September 2005 Joint Statement to “abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs”; a path is open for it to achieve the better and more secure relationship it says it wants with the international community. That includes the U.S. We have no permanent enemies.

Any effort to denuclearize the Korean peninsula must contend with the fact that North Korea is the most secretive and opaque regime on the planet. Our intelligence is far from complete. Despite these inherent limitations, consider what we have achieved and learned thus far through the six-party framework, and how much more could still be possible.

North Korea is now disabling its plutonium production facility at Yongbyon ; not freezing it, as before, but disabling it for the purpose of abandonment. U.S. inspectors are monitoring this process on the ground.

In its declaration, North Korea will state how much plutonium it possesses. We will not accept that statement on faith. We will insist on verification. North Korea has already turned over nearly 19,000 pages of production records from its Yongbyon reactor and associated facilities. With additional information we expect to receive; access to other documents, relevant sites, key personnel and the reactor itself – these records will help to verify the accuracy and completeness of Pyongyang’s declaration. North Korea’s plutonium program has been by far its largest nuclear effort over many decades, and we believe our policy could verifiably get the regime out of the plutonium-making business.

Getting a handle on North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program is harder, because we simply do not know its full scale or what it yielded. And yet, because of our current policy, we now know more about North Korea’s uranium-enrichment efforts than before, and we are learning more still ; much of it troubling. North Korea acknowledges our concerns about its uranium-enrichment program, and we will insist on getting to the bottom of this issue.

Last fall, American pop culture celebrated “Back to the Future Day” — marking the date, 10/21/2015, to which Marty McFly leaps forward from the Reagan ’80s in Back to the Future Part II.

It was a slightly daft commemoration of a pleasant but hardly memorable sequel, and it felt almost like a way for people not to come to grips with the most striking thing about Back to the Future’s 30th anniversary: that we’re now as far from the Reagan 1980s as the teenage Marty was from his parents’ 1950s, and yet the gulf of years separating us from 1985 feels far narrower than the distance from the Eisenhower era that the original film used to such great effect.

The power of the first Back to the Future depended not just on an arbitrary 30-year period, that is, but on how radically America had changed across those decades: Marty’s adolescence and his parents’ courtship lay on opposite sides of (among many other things) rock ’n’ roll, civil rights, Vietnam, the sexual revolution, drug culture, the moon landing, feminism, the apocalyptic ’70s, and, finally, the conservative turn that made this magazine’s 30th anniversary a happy one.

Whereas if you remade Back to the Future now and sent Martina McFly back to ’85, you would have a lot of jokes about life without the iPhone, some shocking shoulder pads, and some sort of “comic” critique of Reagan-era unenlightenment on same-sex marriage. But you wouldn’t have the sense of visiting a past that’s actually another country.

Since National Review spans the same 60 years as the McFly-family saga, Back to the Future offers a useful prism through which to view our situation as the magazine turns (a youthful) 60. For NR’s first 30 years, the history that William F. Buckley Jr. wanted to stand athwart often proceeded at a breakneck pace. But during its second 30, and especially since Communism’s fall, there has been a general slowing, a sense of drift and repetition, a feeling that American society is somehow stuck in place.