https://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/2021/06/lessons-yom-kippur-war-pre-emptive-strikes-and-hugh-fitzgerald/
The Yom Kippur War was a war Israel almost lost. The accepted story is that Israel was taken by surprise; that Egypt and Syria managed to launch simultaneous attacks against an unprepared IDF. It turns out that the true story was more disturbing than that: Israel knew in advance, thanks to American intelligence, of the Arabs’ plans, but refused to engage in a pre-emptive strike because of its leaders’ fear of world condemnation. They were willing, that is, to sacrifice Israeli lives in order to limit the diplomatic damage that would likely result from a pre-emptive strike. This was not a wise decision. The story is here: “Israel Knew of Imminent Attack Before Yom Kippur War, Did Not Strike for Fear of International Reaction: Documents,” by Benjamin Kerstein, Algemeiner, June 6, 2021:
Newly released documents reveal that the Israeli government knew that Syria and Egypt were set to attack Israel on Yom Kippur 1973, but chose not to make a preemptive strike, fearing international condemnation.
The Egyptian and Syrian surprise attack on Israel’s southern and northern borders set off the Yom Kippur War, which proved to be one of Israel’s most traumatic conflicts — with over 3,000 dead, thousands wounded, and enormous economic damage to the Jewish state.
Israeli news site Walla reported Sunday that the newly revealed documents include protocols of the Israeli security cabinet, which met on Yom Kippur just before the Egyptian-Syrian surprise attack to discuss newly arrived intelligence that war was about to break out.
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan told the assembled ministers, “The assumption is that this evening, at dusk, or shortly before dark, a full-scale attack will begin on both fronts.”
There was still time to order airstrikes that day, or the next, on both Egyptian and Syrian forces, and to move more IDF troops into the Sinai (which in 1973 Israel still held), and further south, as well as call up the reserves on which the IDF must depend. But Israel did none of those things before Egypt and Syria attacked. It didn’t want to be seen as the aggressor.
There is a phrase to describe this Israeli attitude: the “galut mentality.” This refers to the attitude of Diaspora Jews of bowing and scraping and being quiet for fear of offending the Christians; thank goodness there was no such attitude in June 1967, when Israel attacked first, putting aside any worries about what the world might think, and consequently was able to destroy the Egyptian Air Force within the first day of the Six-Day War.
This information [about a full-scale attack by Egypt and Syria], he said, had come from American intelligence, which had “credible information” that an attack was imminent and had informed the Israelis a few days before.
Since the intelligence about Egyptian and Syrian plans came from the Americans, they would understand fully – and certainly not condemn – Israel for striking first. They could even testify that they had been the ones to furnish that information to Israel. It’s unclear what “condemnation” Israel was worried about. Did it fear condemnation by the Europeans? By the U.N.? As long as the Americans could exercise their veto power in the U.N. Security Council, the U.N. could no nothing except issue its usual anti-Israel resolutions at the General Assembly, which unlike Security Council resolutions, are non-binding.
