While the West has abandoned its brand of post-9/11 counterinsurgency, our Islamist opponents continue to operate by the old rule book. As we now face the difficult task of crafting an alternative way of war against guerrillas and militia forces, history’s lesson cannot be ignored
We still assume that if correctly managed, counterinsurgency can succeed anywhere. It is a dangerous assumption, for it may lead policymakers to commit American lives, lucre, and prestige to causes better analysis might have revealed to be chimerical.
— D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of US Counterinsurgency Policy
In a speech at the Australian Defence College in Canberra in February 2007, the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, posed the question: “How do the West’s fast-food nations fight a one-hundred-year war against Al-Qaeda and its Islamist allies?” Even as Pace spoke, the response was already well under way in the halls of power in Washington and London: employ armies in long-term counterinsurgency campaigns over years, if not decades, in order to bring about stability in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, there is probably no more unpopular form of war for a liberal democracy than counterinsurgency. The West’s record in fighting modern insurgents from the Cold War era to the age of globalisation is characterised by multiple political reverses.