The Democrats’ CIA report overlooks the indispensable clues enhanced interrogation provided.
The location and elimination of Osama bin Laden was among the greatest achievements of the American intelligence community in the War on Terror — and “enhanced interrogation” had nothing do with it, according to the Senate Democrats’ “torture” report, released earlier this week. According to the much-touted study, “the vast majority of the documents, statements, and testimony highlighting information [that enabled the bin Laden operation] from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, or from CIA detainees more generally, was inaccurate and incongruent with CIA records.” The minority report released by six Senate Intelligence Committee Republicans claims differently.
The majority report documents that the CIA had information about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, the courier whose identification and tracking made possible the bin Laden raid, as early as 2001, and that over the next year they obtained a telephone number and e-mail address believed to be associated with him, details about his age, physical appearance, and family, and information that he was closely tied to bin Laden. According to the majority report, all of this information preceded the use of enhanced interrogation on any CIA detainees.
The CIA, meanwhile, has insisted on the importance of enhanced-interrogation techniques. In a May 2011 radio interview, former CIA director Michael Hayden said, “What we got, the original lead information — and frankly it was incomplete identity information on the couriers — began with information from CIA detainees at the black sites.” Testifying before the Senate Intelligence Committee around the same time, CIA director Leon Panetta stated that “the tipoff on the couriers came from those [detainee] interviews,” a claim he reiterated two years later on CNN’s State of the Union. Other CIA officials testified similarly.
How is one to assess these claims?
Two methodological problems that plague the majority report are likely crucial here. First, the report relies entirely on documentation, which even the report admits is incomplete. Not a single person involved in the CIA’s rendition, detention, and interrogation program — from top officials to interrogators — was interviewed.