Instead of tackling a complex new investment mission, the Fed should establish a clear portfolio wind-down process.
The Federal Reserve recently made clear it is planning to maintain its enormous balance sheet—roughly $4.5 trillion in Treasurys and mortgage-backed securities—for many years, while keeping interest rates near zero at least into 2015.
Far from being neutral or stimulative, these policies have caused huge distortions in financial markets, contributing to slow growth and falling median incomes. Given the tendency of government programs to expand and become permanent, the risk now is that the Fed’s large pool of assets and liabilities evolves into a semi-permanent government-controlled investment fund, a U.S. version of the sovereign-wealth funds created by other governments.
The concept of a sovereign-wealth fund inside the Fed sounds farfetched, but the Fed’s megaportfolio already looks like one in many respects. It is one of the world’s largest and most leveraged bond portfolios, taking massive interest-rate risks. Just to maintain the Fed’s assets as bonds mature will require the Fed to make at least $1 trillion in bond buying decisions over the next five years.
The longer the Fed holds its portfolio, the greater the danger that political forces will nudge its investments away from Treasury securities. The Fed already owns bonds created by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, helping them take market share in the mortgage market from the private sector. There have been many proposals in recent years to set up infrastructure banks, for example. Perhaps the Environmental Protection Agency could set up an environment fund that issues bonds for the Fed to buy as a creative way to finance the fight against global warming. Japan, China and others own large holdings of dollar-denominated bonds, and it’s easy to see a future Fed edging its portfolio into euro- and yen-denominated bonds to manipulate the value of the dollar.
Maintaining the large Fed balance sheet raises a host of other concerns too. These include conflicts of interest among the Fed’s monetary, regulatory and investment roles, and the risk of distracting the Fed from its crucial lender-of-last-resort responsibility. Major new problems are inevitable regarding investment transparency and political decisions on the appropriate levels of Fed payments to the Treasury Department and banks.